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Title of Dissertation: Shenzhen Energy Group’s Strategic Decision of Logistics 
Service 
 
Degree:                               MSc 
 
This dissertation is a study of the performance of different logistics service solutions 
in Shenzhen Energy Group, comparing the results calculated by classic financial 
methods with each other. 
 
An overlook of Shenzhen Energy Group is demonstrated under the present situation, 
and some theories have also been presented behind this phenomenon. 
 
I put up specific analyses of the externality and internality of Shenzhen Energy 
Group with the help of Michael Porter's Five Forces Model. With the fluctuation of 
coal price, Shenzhen Energy Group needs a new method of coal procurement and 
logistics management to conquer the dilemma.  
 
Specific modes of logistics solutions are calculated and analyzed in Chapter Two. 
Then, I conclude that if the thermal power station can run logistics as well as 
professional logistics providers, it should use the in-house strategy in order to make 
the total logistics cost at the optimal level. 
 
Further comparison tells us that the operational cost weighs most of the total 
logistics cost, and a thermal power station should outsource the logistics service if it 
cannot control the logistics cost as well as a logistics expert. Additionally, it is 
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cost-effective for an enterprise to build new ships than to acquire second-hand ships. 
And I support the strategic alliance of establishing a joint venture of coal 
transportation for Shenzhen Energy Group. 
 
The freight rate is the utmost factor when a power station decides to outsource the 
logistics service or establish a joint venture. So the two parties involved in the joint 
venture contract should trade off and negotiate this issue meticulously.  
 
At the end of my dissertation, I strongly recommend Shenzhen Energy Group 
cooperate with COSCO to establish a logistics company transporting coal for all the 
thermal power stations in this energy group. In favor of both the two parties, it is 
best for this joint venture to build new ships, and carefully deal with the issue of 
freight rate. 
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Shenzhen Energy Group was established in the early 1990s in order to solve the 
problem of electricity shortage in the emerging southern Chinese city of Shenzhen. 
And this firm is a public company in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market, most of the 
stock shares owned by the state. From this aspect, it can be concluded that this 
company is a typical Chinese stated-owned enterprise with its core business lying in 
coal-fired power stations. So far, Shenzhen Energy Group has seven power stations, 
two of which are coal-fired power stations in Shenzhen with 6×30Kw and 2×35Kw 
coal generators. Though Shenzhen Energy Group has fewer coal-fired power stations 
in number, these coal-fired power stations have occupied the top position of 
importance in this group because they are the most mature and profitable business in 
SEG, and hence their profit and cost has crucial significance towards the whole 
group. Maybe, these coal-fired power stations can be wholly named as the “cash 
cow” in Shenzhen Energy Group. 
 
The price of coal has strategic influence on the business performance of Shenzhen 
Energy Group because the core business of coal power stations has coal as its only 
chief raw material, and inevitably, the fluctuation of coal price will affect its balance 
sheet dramatically. According to empirical experience, the fuel cost consists 60% of 
the total cost in a coal-fired power station so the price of coal plays a strategic role of 
cost control in a coal-fired power station. Unfortunately, during the year of 2004 and 
2005, the price of coal has rocketed up by 15.08% in average whilst the highest by 
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60%, up to RMB 400-500 per ton. What makes things even worse is that the freight 
rate of coal transport and some intermediary costs have dramatically increased as 
well. For instance, the freight rate of ocean transport has commonly gone up by 
RMB14-16 per ton since January 2005. However, the electricity price is not that 
friendly to the market economy since the government in China collectively and 
centrally controls the electricity price. Consequently, the electricity price cannot 
respond to the fluctuation of coal price quickly and only slight adjustment has been 
made to the electricity price, which has little effect on compensating the extra cost of 
those coal-fired power stations. 
 
Like many other enterprises running coal-fired power stations, Shenzhen Energy 
Group should also be confronted with the cost pressure arising from the increased 
coal price and freight rate despite the up-going demand for electricity with its price 
unchanged. As a result, in order to avoid the decline in its financial performance and 
keep the stock price stable, Shenzhen Energy Group has to deal with the crisis of the 
insane coal price in the short term. And in the long term, the company has to set up a 
new strategy to maintain its competitive advantages lying in a relatively stable price 
of raw material supply. The re-consideration of its logistics system can be a very 
meaningful topic of the new strategy because a more competitive supply chain can 
become a new core competence in Shenzhen Energy Group as Wal-Mart and IKEA 
are doing in the 21st century. In this century, the competition is no longer between 
single entities, but between different supply chains. Therefore, an effective supply 
chain can make the balance sheet of this group more decent and keep those 











The modern supply chain management philosophy understands that the competition 
today is between different supply chains rather than between separate entities. As a 
result, the extra cost in a supply chain should be removed from the whole supply 
chain rather than be passed from one to another. With the development of Chinese 
economy, its domestic enterprises are so eager to change their traditional logistics 
operational methods that they are looking for a completely new mode of logistics 
service with more expertise and competence. Hence, this issue has occupied the 
position of top importance in the visionary and energetic Chinese entrepreneur’s 
daily resolution. Therefore, it is necessary for Shenzhen Energy Group to establish a 
new logistics system so that it can conquer the crisis of the fluctuation of coal price.  
 
When talking about the re-construction of a logistics service system, one must think 
of third-party logistics at sight. TPL is just like any procurement behavior of other 
service or products from the suppliers to the manufacturers. From a broad viewpoint 
or, in other words, a macro-viewpoint, third party logistics shares the common 
features of other outsourcing activities, such as the outsourcing of HR or IT 
resources. It is a trade-off between cost and control. As a result, the strategic 
decision-making process in an enterprise to decide whether it should employ TPL 
appears to be the same as the usual outsourcing decision making process. The goal of 
TPL is to reduce the investment in specialty of both people and facilities without 
affecting the enterprise’s control of the whole logistics system. Hence, the 
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enterprises could mainly focus on their core competence and through cooperation, 
the partners of logistics outsourcing are able to make full use of each other’s 
competitive advantages and become more powerful and competitive in the market. 
There are several types of TPL service. For instance, some companies utilize the 
warehousing service while some others are employing the transport part. However, 
fundamentally, there are only two kinds of TPL, outsourcing the whole supply chain 
management and outsourcing part/parts of the whole supply chain management. And 
in other aspects, the strategic alliance is much more integrated than the usual TPL 
cooperation, so this type of TPL or strategic alliance is much more competitive. 
 
However, although TPL enjoys so many advantages, it also suffers some 
disadvantages that might ruin the common application of TPL to cases or enterprises 
all around the world. For example, the enterprises are so afraid to lose control of the 
logistics service. Is there a feasible strategy to combine the advantages of both 
in-house and outsourcing logistics service? Hereinafter, I am going to introduce a 
new idea of hybrid operational philosophy that can be justified under the joint 
venture mode. By comparison between the results of these three solutions, I will 
create a methodology to select the most suitable solution and the criteria for 
judgment. In my dissertation, I recommend the hybrid solution of a joint venture. 
However, maybe it cannot be valid or suitable to every case, so the methodology and 












1 The Environmental Analyses of this Enterprise 
 
1.1 The External Situation of this Enterprise 
 
Now I am going to discuss the external situations of Shenzhen Energy Group by the 
means of Michael Porter's Five Forces Model. Figure 1 represents the main 
philosophy of Michael Porter's Five Forces Model. 
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Figure 1 - Michael Porter's Five Forces Model 
Source: Dr. Gary A. Lombardo. (2005). Managing Strategy and Change in Shipping. Unpublished 
lecture handout, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden 
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From figure 1, I can find that there are five determinant factors in Michael Porter’s 





First of all, I will analyze the Chinese domestic coal market in details, because it is 
the market that really determines the position of the suppliers and buyers when they 
are negotiating with each other about the price and some other significant terms in 
the trade contracts. 
 
Chinese economy has grown dramatically in recent year, and the domestic energy 
consumption will rise accordingly. From figure 2, with the development of Chinese 
economy, the electricity generated by coal-fired power stations has increased 
dramatically in the last decade. As a result, the fuel coal consumed by those 
coal-fired power stations will also grow tremendously as shown in figure 2. Hereby, 
I assume that if the coal consumed by those coal-fired power stations occupied most 
of the total coal consumption in China, the fluctuation of the electric coal demand 


























Figure 2 - Electricity Generated by Coal-fired Power Stations and Volume of 
Fuel Coal Consumed from 1990 to 2002 in China 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China web site has the data in figure 2 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn ) 
 
From figure 3, it is easy to find that the proportion of the electric fuel coal used by 
the thermal power stations weighs most of the total amount of the coal consumption 
in China. And the proportion of electric fuel coal in the total coal consumption has 
grown from 26% in 1990 to 48% in 2002. In addition, the proportion of electric fuel 
coal trends to increase in the future. For instance, in the year of 2005, all the thermal 
power stations produced 1986 billion KWH of electricity, and the growth of the 
thermal power stations is higher than the growth of the whole electric industry in 
2004 and 2005. So the demand of the electric coal can affect the price of the whole 
coal market enormously. And in fact, we can find that from 1990 to 2002, the total 























Figure 3 - Proportion of Electric Fuel Coal in the Total Coal Consumption in 
China 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China web site has the data in figure 3 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn ) 
 
From figure 4, we can find that the domestic production of coal cannot surplus the 
domestic coal consumption in most years, and sometimes the supply of coal were 
even much less than the demand, such as in the year of 2000. Since the year of 2000, 
the coal consumption has increased much faster than the coal production, whilst the 
coal production has been relatively stable. Consequently, some unpredictable 
policies or government control can influence the domestic coal production severely 
in China. And I will analyze this cause in details later when talking about the trend 
of the price of electric coal in the domestic market. Hereby, I can conclude that the 
supply of coal is less than the demand of coal in Chinese domestic coal market, so 
the coal price will keep on rising if the Chinese economy goes on growing as the 
current trend and the domestic coal production is still limited due to the existing 
technology and coalmines. And I will analyze this conclusion in the following 
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Figure - 4 Supply and Demand of Coal in the Chinese Domestic Coal Market 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China web site has the data in figure 4 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn ) 
 
Shenzhen Energy Group’s suppliers are almost dwelled in the northern part of China 
whilst those coal-fired power stations of Shenzhen Energy Group are all scattered 
around in the southern part of this country. So the coal has to be transported 
throughout China from north to south either by train or by sea, and this geographical 
separation between the suppliers and the consumers derives the need of coal 
transportation. Contrary to the concentrated control of coal production to few coal 
enterprises in the developed coal-production countries, Chinese coal industry is 
loosely dotted with small mines and the top eight coal enterprises have occupied 
only 20% of the total market share in China. In terms of this, I am able to conclude 
that the Chinese domestic coal market is a Perfectly Competitive Market since this 
market is full of millions of different suppliers in small size who are producing 
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homogenous goods of herein coal and whose individual price is determined by the 
average price of the whole market. Figure 5 is the demonstration of a Perfectly 
Competitive Market. 
 










 Industry Output 
Figure - 5 Perfect Competition 
Source: Samuelson, P.A., & Nordaus, W.D. (1998). Economics (16th ed.). The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. 
 
According to statistics, coal-fired power stations now consume more than 60% of the 
total coal production in China as I have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
As a result, the coal price in the domestic market is profoundly affected by the 
domestic consumption of electricity. And in the year of 2004, electricity 
consumption of China rose by 14.9% more than that in 2003 with an astonishing 
annual GDP growth of 9.5%. According to the continuous remarkable performance 
of Chinese economy in recent years, the optimistic domestic economists dare to 
predict that the strong growth of Chinese economy will keep in that trend for a long 
period of time. So hereby, the skyrocketing coal price can be justified by the 
 10
astounding growth of the electricity demand induced by the magnificent domestic 
GDP advancement. For instance, in the year of 2005, China produced 1038 million 
tons of concrete, 49 million tons of fertilizer, 34 million tons of steel. It is known to 
all that these heavy industries are extremely energy consuming. Due to the 
tremendous growth in coal demand, the demand curve will move towards northeast. 
 
Though the demand for coal has reached a historical level in China, the coal 
production has been encumbered with some government policies for safety concerns. 
For example, on July 21st, year 2005, 5290 coalmines were forced to cease to operate 
according to the law. The coal mines in China are potentially dangerous and poorly 
equipped, and in the first six months of 2005, 2672 miners died in accidents when 
working, rising by 3.3% more than that during the same period of 2004. Therefore, 
the government is determined to formalize the operation procedures and safety 
standards of all the mines nationwide in spite of the huge demand for coal 
production. And in the year of 2004, a serious accident called “Xing Ning” happened 
in a coalmine from Meizhou of Guangdong Province. After this accident, the 
provincial administration of Guangdong Province prohibits all the local coalmines to 
work any longer. As a result, from that time, all the coal used for electricity 
generation in Guangdong Province has to be imported from outside, such as Shanxi 
Province or even Vietnam, let alone Shenzhen Energy Group. So the coal transport 
of SEG has become the bottleneck of the whole supply chain of coal, and unless 
SEG can deal with this coal transport issue well, it could not run at a competitive 
level. Due to the unpredictable production encumbrance and the limitation of the 
coal production, the coal supply will not increase too much. As a result, the supply 
cure will move towards southeast slightly. Figure 6 is the final results of these 




















Figure - 6 Price Fluctuation of Coal 
Source: Samuelson, P.A., & Nordaus, W.D. (1998). Economics (16th ed.). The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. 
 
From the above analyses, I can conclude that the price of coal will rise according to 
the classic micro-economy theory, no matter who is the buyer of the coal, because all 
of the reflections mentioned above are automatic responses to the market conditions, 
and a single entity in China is not large enough to affect the price of the whole 
market on its own except the interference from the central government. So the fuel 
cost of most coal-fired power stations will inevitably ascend to a higher level despite 
the complaints they have yelled at their suppliers because in this world, there is not 
such a supplier who would like to share his profit with his clients when the market is 
almost reaching the zenith.  
 
Moreover, there are some special conditions of the coal market in China. The coal 
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and electricity enterprises have very special relationship since 1992. After the price 
of coal was allowed to change freely according to the market in 1992, the domestic 
coal market has been deliberately divided into two segments, one of which 
consisting 60% of the whole coal market is for the coal-fired power stations and 
priced by the government, the other of which consisting 40% of the whole coal 
market is for the free market and priced by the market. Therefore, the coal price for 
electricity enterprises are much lower than the market price, so almost every coal 
enterprise who provides the electricity coal is extremely dissatisfied with the current 
pricing policy and has furious argument with those coal-fired power stations about 
the price issue. Finally, it comes the very moment to settle this issue because the coal 
price has almost reached its ceiling in the past two years, and the conflicts between 
coal enterprises and coal-fired power stations have been triggered even more furious 
than before. For example, some coal enterprises would even breach the signed 
contracts of electricity coal rather than fulfill them. These coal suppliers possess 
extremely strong bargaining power not only because they are the state-owned large 
enterprises but also they have done their business under the principles of the market 
economy theory for a long time. As a result, the customers of these coal enterprises 
might probably be the international buyers, and these providers do not have to sell 
their coal with superior quality at an undesirable price. Hereinafter, I will discuss this 
market phenomenon in details through figures and economics analyses. 
 




60% of the total 
domestic coal market
Free Market Coal 
40% of the total 
domestic coal market 
 
International Coal Market 




Figure 7 - Deliberate Segmentation of the Coal Market through Political Means 
in China 
 
According to the above analyses, the price of the electricity coal is strictly regulated 
and “suggested” by the central government. However, in fact, the global coal market 
should be regarded as an integrated entity. So if there were not quota or export tariff 
in Chinese coal exportation, at this price level, those suppliers would not be willing 
to provide enough electricity coal to the buyers. As a result, the needed coal amount 
for the coal-fired power stations equals to Q2 in figure 6 whist the coal amount that 
those suppliers are willing to provide at this price level equals to Q1 in figure 6. So 
the gap between the supply and demand which equals to Q2-Q1 has to be fed 
through other means, such as coal import or procurement of market coal at the free 
market price. Or I could explain this phenomenon in another aspect. Some coal that 
ought to be provided as the electricity coal would flow to the domestic free market or 
international market, and those coal-fired power stations has to buy this coal at a 
higher price, as the quantity flow Ⅰand Ⅱ shown in figure 7. In July 2005, the 
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coal price of the international market was 52 USD per metric ton, and at the same 
time, the coal price of the domestic free market was 400 RMB per metric ton. So the 
coal price of these two markets was almost the same, but because the average freight 
rate of international coal transport was 15 USD per ton, the coal of the domestic free 
market was more competitive than the international coal. However, some neighbor 
countries of China, such as Japan or South Korea, are able to import the coal from 
the Chinese free market because of the lower freight rate due to the closer 
geographic distance. Similarly, some neighbor countries of China, such as Vietnam, 
are able to export the coal to South China due to the lower freight rate. As a result, 
the quantity flow Ⅰ of coal can be feasible without the existence of quota and tariff. 
In other words, some Chinese coal-fired power stations might lose some domestic 
electricity coal at a lower price, and have to import some coal at a higher price from 
the international market instead. Similarly, in the domestic coal market, the 
electricity coal can be more easily changed to free market coal by selling at a higher 
price and breaching the signed contracts when the coal price is high enough. So the 
quantity flow Ⅱ of coal can be feasible as well. Fundamentally, in spite of the 
complicated coal flow procedure, the so called market coal obtained by the coal-fired 
power stations at a higher price level is just the coal which ought to be the electricity 
coal, but the coal suppliers are not willing to sell the coal to the coal-fired power 
stations at such a low price. In conclusion, the gap between the supply and demand 
that equals to Q2-Q1 will be fitted by importing or procuring international or 






















Figure 8 - Current Chinese Electricity Coal Market Condition 
Source: Samuelson, P.A., & Nordaus, W.D. (1998). Economics (16th ed.). The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. 
 
However, in reality, the Chinese government has imposed strict export and import 
quota on the coal exportation since the year of 2003. For instance, in the year of 
2006, the quota of coal export in China is 80 million metric tons. So the coal of the 
domestic free market cannot easily flow to the international market, and the volume 
of the coal export only occupies slight proportion of the total domestic coal 
production. Therefore, the Chinese domestic coal market is a relatively single entity, 
and the suppliers would not provide enough coal for those coal-fired power stations 
at such a low price level set by the central government. 
Figure 9 can demonstrate the situation that I have discussed above. It is not difficult 
to find that in the past decade, the domestic coal supply cannot surplus the domestic 
coal demand, and it is necessary for the domestic coal users to import coal from the 
international market. Unlike the usual assumption made by most Chinese people due 
to the large domestic coal inventory and production, the Chinese coal market absorbs 
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Figure 9 - Domestic Supply and Demand of Coal in China 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China web site has the data in figure 9 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn ) 
 
As a result, when the coal price goes up dramatically, those coal suppliers will have 
more buyers and stronger bargaining power than before because it is the booming 
demand of coal that has caused the price to rise. So at this moment, the suppliers will 
exert themselves to increase the price of electricity coal because of the stronger 
bargaining power. And the outcome of this argument is that the price of those 
electricity coal procurement contracts has increased by 5% in average in the year of 
2006. And the above result is negotiated by the suppliers, buyers and the government 
through great effort for millions of times. 
 
In conclusion, Shenzhen Energy Group could not control the price of the coal unless 
Chinese authorities permit the exchange of coal futures that is illegal at this moment. 
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Therefore, the fuel cost of SEG will rise according to the market in the short term, 
and in the long term, the coal market will fluctuate more widely than before since the 
domestic coal market has been changing much freer. The supply chain of coal for 
Shenzhen Energy Group becomes more and more vital for SEG because the risk 
involved in the fuel supply has become much bigger. Hence, the re-consideration of 
the supply chain for SEG has reached the strategic role in this enterprise’s business 
arena. 
 
Similarly, in terms of coal transport, because of the increased demand for coal and 
the geographical isolation between coal production and consumption areas in China, 
the demand for coal transport has ascend dramatically as well in 2004 and 2005. Due 
to the limited total transport capacity in the market, the freight rate of coal has risen 
accordingly. For instance, since January 2005, the freight rate of offshore ocean 
transport has increased by RMB14-16 per ton. The offshore transport suppliers, such 
as China Shipping and COSCO, also have very strong bargaining power like those 
coal suppliers. Although the ocean transport is more mature and competitive than 
other industries in China because the international ocean transport market of China 
was opened to the outside much earlier than other industries, the domestic offshore 
ocean transport must been fulfilled by those ships flying the Chinese flags. Therefore, 
the domestic offshore transport market is a relative separate market in China. This 
market acts in accordance with the classic economics theory as well, so the supply 
and demand of ocean transport capacity will determine the freight rate. However, the 
carriers are able to withdraw some old ships trading in the international market and 
put them into the domestic coal trading market in a very short period of time through 
the method of ship importation instead of new ship-building or the procurement of 
second-hand ships. Those ship owners can make their ships flying the convenient 
flags become the ships flying the Chinese flags and registered under the Chinese 
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Nationality. From this aspect, the offshore coal transport market is more competitive 
than the coal market. But more than 50% of the offshore transport market of China 
has been under the control of the company named China Shipping. Therefore, this 
company has very strong bargaining power in the domestic transport market and can 
influence this transport market dramatically. Though COSCO is re-establishing and 
integrating the offshore transport in the group, the market share of each ship owner 
in the domestic transport market will not change in the short term. 
 
From the above analyses of the suppliers, I conclude that now Shenzhen Energy 
Group is facing serious challenges and great pressure from the up-going price and 
freight rate of coal in the market. If the enterprise wants its balance sheet to keep 
healthy, it should resort to some new management concepts or logistics solutions, 
which will be helpful to their cost control. For instance, the upstream or downstream 
integration of the whole supply chain can fulfill this target of those coal-fired power 




The buyers of Shenzhen Energy Group are almost the local residence, industrial and 
commercial enterprises, and agricultures in Shenzhen. The electricity has been 
divided into mainly four categories in China, such as residential electricity, industrial 
electricity, commercial electricity and agricultural electricity etc. Hence, the price of 
electricity various from type to type, and the price of industrial electricity is the 
highest whilst the price of the agricultural electricity is the lowest. The price of 
electricity is quite different from other products or service since it is strictly 
regulated by the government and cannot change flexibly in accordance with the 
market. In addition, in China, the price of electricity is pretty much lower than that in 
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the western countries, such as United Kingdom and France that have a relatively 
more scientific pricing system of electricity. For example, according to the data 
provided by J.P Morgan, the return rate of the investment is only 0.4% in the 
electricity transmission network in China annually. However, in many other 
countries, this rate can be around 4%-7%, and in fact, this return rate of China is the 
lowest in the world. Personally, I do not think that the current pricing system of 
electricity would change in the near future, though the electricity price has recently 
been changed slightly nodded by the relevant regulatory authorities, because this 
revolutionary adjustment of the electricity pricing policy must be discussed and 
authorized by the central government, and inevitably, the whole procedure of this 
revolution requires plenty of time. In terms of this, though the consumers of 
electricity are loosely scattered around, their bargaining power is very strong, 
because the government will protect the interest of most citizens and any slight 
fluctuation of electricity price could not come into force unless series of serious and 
tedious audits are heard by the municipal jury. Though the price of the industrial 
electricity has been raised somehow through great effort of those electric enterprises 
approved by the government, the price of the electricity cannot rise as easily as 
























Demand Curve Price 
Industry Output Q1 Q2 Q3 
Pc 
Figure 10 - Supply and Demand Curve under Government’s Regulation of a 
Ceiling Price 
Source: Samuelson, P.A., & Nordaus, W.D. (1998). Economics (16th ed.). The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. 
 
Hereinafter, I will analyze the effects caused by the government’s regulation 
imposing on the electricity price. In fact, from figure 10, I am able to find that the 
government’s ceiling price of electricity is detrimental to the current situation of 
electricity shortage, because it is not difficult to conclude that the electricity shortage 
is even worse when the demand for electricity has gone up but the ceiling price 
remains the same. So the government should alter its regulations and policies of 
electricity pricing system, and obviously only can a free electricity market relieve the 




In light of buyers, I conclude that the current situation is very serious for Shenzhen 
Energy Group because its profit margin could not be enlarged in the short term 
despite the increased revenue. Because this company can hardly find any methods to 





The substitutes of electricity do not really exist nowadays, because it is a certain kind 
of energy with special features of its own, for example, environmental friendliness, 
restriction of the electric appliance’s consumption range, and transmission simplicity 
etc. As a result, the electricity consumption cannot easily be replaced by gasoline or 
coal. For instance, the TV sets or the lights cannot consume gasoline as their energy. 
So the real competition is between several types of electricity generated by different 
methods, such as nuclear power stations, coal-fired power stations, and hydraulic 
power stations. In China, among the total installed capacity of electricity, 73.7% is 
from thermal power stations, and 23.2% is from hydraulic power stations. Thereafter, 
I am going to compare them with each other from different aspects. 
 
Comparison of the Construction Period: The ordinary construction period of a 
hydraulic power station is about 8 to 10 years, which is around 6 to 10 years of a 
thermal power station as well, and roughly 10 years of a nuclear power station. So 
the construction periods of these three different types of power stations are relatively 
similar, and in terms of the construction period, these three different types of power 
stations are in the same competitive level. 
 
Investment Comparison: According to Mr. Qiu’s thesis, at the end of the 
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completion of construction, the total investment of a hydraulic power station is 
RMB2600 per KW, that of a thermal power station being RMB2888 per KW and 
that of a nuclear power station being RMB6000 per KW at the discount rate of 10% 
in the year of 1991. Obviously, a thermal power station as Shenzhen Energy Group 
is running is almost as competitive as a hydraulic power station, and additionally 
they are more advantageous than a nuclear one in terms of the initial investment. 
 
Annual Operational Cost: Mr. Qiu also calculated the operational cost per year 
respectively for a hydraulic, thermal and nuclear power station, and that of a 
hydraulic one is RMB0.46 cent per KW×h, that of a thermal one being RMB3.4 cent 
per KW×h, and that of a nuclear one being RMB2.86 cent per KW×h in the early of 
the 1990s. It is self-evident that the annual running cost of a hydraulic power station 
is much more advantageous than that of a thermal one or a nuclear one. And the 
thermal power stations are as competitive as nuclear ones in terms of the operational 
cost in China. Moreover, Shenzhen Energy Group is now suffering from a server 
crisis of coal price fluctuation which makes the relative high operational cost even 
higher. 
 
Table 1 - Comparison among Hydraulic, Thermal and Nuclear Power Stations 
 
Construction Investment Operational Cost 
Hydraulic 8-10  2600 0.46 
Thermal 6-10  2888 3.4 
Nuclear 10  6000 2.86 
Type 
Criteria 
Source: Qiu, Z.E. (1991). The systematic analyses of the economy comparison among hydraulic, 
thermal and nuclear power stations. Yangtze River, 22, 32-35. 
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Table 1 has summarized the mentioned results of the comparison above, and I can 
find that a hydraulic power station is the most competitive among these three types 
because the investment cost and the operational cost of such a power station are both 
the lowest compared with the thermal power stations and the nuclear power stations. 
In the financial aspect, the thermal power stations are almost as competitive as those 
nuclear power stations.  
 
However, the accessibility of a power station is not only connected with the financial 
report, but also it is connected with the current technological level and 
environmental concerns in a region or a country. For instance, the nuclear power 
stations are very technology intensive, and the local residence believe that they are 
potentially hazardous to the environment due to the radiation probability. As a result, 
the enterprises that want to invest in such a project cannot obtain approval easily 
from the government, because the public are against such a project. Similarly, 
environmentalists argue with the scientists and government severely about the issue 
of the construction of hydraulic power stations because those environmentalists 
believe that a hydraulic power station is harmful to the ecology system in the 
surrounding region. As a result, the hydraulic power stations and the nuclear power 
stations have developed quite slowly in these years in China due to the technological 
and environmental restraints. 
 
After the above analyses, I conclude that Shenzhen Energy Group suffers from a 
huge cost disadvantage arising from the skyrocketing coal price compared with its 
biggest competitors of hydraulic power stations, but the inaccessibility of hydraulic 
resources in China and the time-consuming approval procedure of a hydraulic power 
station can relieve this competitive pressure. So the current competitors of Shenzhen 
Energy Group are mainly from those operators running thermal power stations as 
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Shenzhen Energy Group has occupied 80% of the installed capacity of electricity in 
Shenzhen, and appears to be the monopoly in the local electric industry. So in the 
short term, no electric enterprises will be able to catch up with Shenzhen Energy 
Group in the provincial market share. However, in the long term, after the 
completion of some major hydraulic projects, like the famous China Three Gorges 
Project, Shenzhen Energy Group will be confronted with serious competition in light 
of higher viable cost and logistics cost. Obviously, a hydraulic power station does 
not need any fuel but only water is adequate to drive the generators. In terms of this, 
such a hydraulic power station does not require any raw materials or derived 
logistics service, which involves quite a lot of cost and risk. However, the hydraulic 
power stations also suffer from their own disadvantages, such as the long distance 
between the power stations and the electricity consuming areas, and the imbalance of 
hydraulic resources among different seasons. So in light of this, the competition 
between hydraulic power stations and thermal ones will continue for a long period of 
time. The local electric market of Shenzhen will mostly consume coal-fired 
electricity because the hydraulic energy resources in the Guangdong Province are not 
very abundant and the thermal power stations are more accessible and feasible. 
 
Shenzhen Nan Shan Power Station Corporation has an installed capacity of almost 
900,000 KW, and it is the biggest thermal power station driven by LNG in China. 
LNG has been recently introduced to China as the fuel for power stations, and it is 
very environmentally friendly. Therefore, the developed countries are more willing 
to construct this type of power stations, especially in Japan. More importantly, the 
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construction of a LNG power station is much cheaper than that of a coal-fired power 
station, so the annual depreciation of a LNG power station is much lower. But the 
market share of Nan Shan Power Station is much lower than that of Shenzhen 
Energy Group; so in the short term, Nan Shan is a threat to SEG, but cannot compete 
with SEG. Additionally, in the long term, the price of LNG might probably increase 
by 75% during the next five years in Asia. Hence, the fuel cost of such a LNG power 
station will rise significantly accordingly. Furthermore, the current price of LNG is 
higher than the price of coal, but the price of coal will not fluctuate as much as the 
price of LNG. As a result, I take a pessimistic view of the Nan Shan’s return rate to 
its stakeholders since the variable cost of Nan Shan Power Station Corporation will 
ascend more dramatically than the variable cost of Shenzhen Energy Group, 
especially in the fuel cost that comprises most of the total cost. In conclusion, in the 
long term, Shenzhen Energy will be much more competitive than Nan Shan Power 
Station Corporation in the cost. 
 
The new energy resources such as solar energy, nuclear energy and wind energy is 
very expensive in the initial capital investment, because these are technology 
intensive projects, and the introduction of these new concepts requires time, 
investment, experiments, observation and promotion. Thereby, it will take tens of 
years for those scientists to spread those technologies before they can really take the 
place of the traditional energy resources causing heavy pollution. So in the short 
term, the power stations transforming the new energy resources into electricity 
would not come into the spotlight.  
 
1.2 The Internal Situation of this Enterprise 
 
Mawan Power Station is a sub-company of Shenzhen Energy Group and it is also the 
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core business of SEG. Therefore, the management level of this power plant occupies 
the top position in SEG. Hence, I believe that the business mode of this thermal 
power station is suitable enough to embody the operation of the whole group.  
 
The first phase of the construction of Mawan thermal plant has an installed capacity 
of 2×350,000KW whilst the second having 4×350,000KW. During the first phase, 
the annual coal consumption is 2,100,000 tons whilst the second being 4,200,000 
tons. In summary, the annual coal consumption of this power plant equals to 
6,300,000 tons. Figure 11 demonstrates the management structure of Mawan Power 
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Figure 11 - Operational Structure of Shenzhen Energy Group 




From figure 11 of Shenzhen Energy Group, I can find that Shenzhen Energy Group 
possesses a complex bureaucratic structure which makes the whole group operate 
systematically and functionally. And its sub-company, Shenzhen Energy Logistics 
Service Company, executes the logistics service for all these power stations under 
the leadership of Shenzhen Energy Group. However, except some trucks for inland 
transport, this logistics company does not possess any ships for water transport, or 
any trains for long-distance inland transport. The chief purpose of this logistics 
transport company should be the integration of the whole procurement and transport 
activities, in other words, the integration of the whole supply chain. So we can take 
Shenzhen Energy Group Logistics Service Corporation as a 4PL logistics operator 
who integrates the whole supply chain of coal procurement for Shenzhen Energy 
Group. Though Shenzhen Energy Logistics Service Corporation has outsourced the 
logistics service to several professional logistics companies, such as COSCO 
Shenzhen, the whole supply chain is not perfectly arranged, because Shenzhen 
Energy Group almost procures its total volume of coal from several but limited 
numbers of coalmines in north China and this strategy ignores a very significant 
philosophy of portfolio concept. Hereinafter, I will elaborate this theory through a 









Table 2 - Original Coal Procurement Plan 
Supplier Quantity Price Cost (Thousand) 
Pithead Coal 600,000 295 177,000 
Yunnan Coalmines 100,000 298 29,800 
Guizhou Coalmines 400,000 306 122,400 
Sichuan Coalmines 100,000 310 31,000 
Chongqing Coalmines 100,000 308 30,800 
Hunan Coalmines 100,000 310 31,000 
Local Coalmines 100,000 270 27,000 
Total 1,500,000 299 449,000 
 
Table 2 is a coal procurement plan of a power station1, and the total amount of coal 
consumed annually is fixed. The average total cost of the coal equals to only 299 
RMB per ton in this strategy whilst the average price of coal is from about 310 to 
350 RMB per ton in the domestic market. From table 2, it is not difficult to find that 
this strategy costs less than that procuring all the coal from north China and the total 
risk can also be reduced by this portfolio strategy by allocating the procurement of 
coal to several suppliers, because a coal-fired power station will possess more 
bargaining power when dealing with several small or medium local suppliers than 
when dealing with only one or two large state-owned suppliers. Therefore, when the 
market fluctuates greatly, the coal-fired power station will be able to control the 
fixed contracts and price. Furthermore, if it is possible, the coal-fired power station 
can even invest in the coalmines. In this way, the coal-fired power stations will have 
more control in the coal price when the market fluctuates. Moreover, strategic 
alliance with powerful coalmines can also help coal-fired power stations to control 
                                                        
1 I deliberately create all the information in table 2 & 3 to support my following ideas. 
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the price and risk involved in the coal procurement, but this situation cannot 
demonstrate the advantages of the portfolio strategy. The plan in table two is not the 
most cost-effective one, because through exquisite linear programming, I can obtain 
a plan that makes the total cost at a lower point without affecting the total 
procurement quantity1. 
 
Table 3 - Final Coal Procurement Arrangement 
Supplier Quantity Price Cost (Thousand) 
Pithead Coal 650,000 295 191,750 
Yunnan Coalmines 100,000 298 29,800 
Guizhou Coalmines 300,000 306 91,800 
Sichuan Coalmines 700,000 310 21,700 
Chongqing Coalmines 500,000 308 15,400 
Hunan Coalmines 800,000 310 24,800 
Local Coalmines 250,000 270 67,500 
Total 1,500,000 295 442,750 
 
Table 3 is the adjusted coal procurement plan of this power station, and from table 3, 
it is easy to find that the total cost of coal has been reduced by over than RMB 6 
million and the average price of coal is RMB 4 less than the former plan. Obviously, 
after adjustment, the procurement plan becomes more scientific and cost-effective. 
However, it may not be the most desirable procurement plan since the restraints of 
these factors vary from case to case and the desired objectives do not always remain 
the same. 
 
                                                        
1 Professor Ding Yi-zhong exquisitely discussed the procedure of decision-making and linear programming in her 
class and book. 
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From the above example, I can conclude that the total procurement cost will fall 
down when the whole logistics system becomes more sophisticated or a strategic 
alliance is successfully introduced to the group. If the logistics system of this power 
station is effective enough to afford a more complex supply chain or procurement 
plan, the total procurement cost of this enterprise will decrease accordingly. So the 
whole supply chain should be taken as an integrated one and the total cost of this 
supply chain is much more important than the sole logistics cost or the procurement 
cost 1 . As the new modern supply chain management philosophy goes, the 
competition today is between different supply chains rather than between separate 
entities.  
 
In conclusion, from the above analyses, Shenzhen Energy Group needs to re-develop 
its logistics system to improve the performance of the whole supply chain. Though 
the current logistics system of SEG is relatively advanced with the philosophy of 
4PL management, the logistics service still has some leeway for improvement. 
Hereinafter, I will present three possible solutions to the current logistics system of 










                                                        






2 The Possible Solutions of the Issues in this Enterprise 
 
Shenzhen Energy Group has many options to improve the efficiency of its logistics 
service so that the supply chain of those power stations can be further integrated. A 
well-organized logistics system can greatly help the supply chain improve its 
performance. The transport of coal is the bottleneck of the supply chain of coal, 
because the volume of coal transportation is so huge that the cost and risk involved 
in the coal transport are very tremendous. For instance, a full ship of coal just 
resembles an enormous volume of coal in inventory that ties up with plenty of 
money and risk. Therefore, the shorter the transport time is, the less the interest lost 
will be. A just-in-time logistics service is also suitable for a thermal power plant to 
transport coal so that the inventory cost can be at the lowest level. Because the daily 
consumption of coal is very astounding in a thermal power station, the safe inventory 
level occupies the utmost position for a thermal power station. Once the inventory of 
coal runs out, the off-work cost of such a power station can be astonishingly high. A 
roughly optimal inventory level can be found through calculation to make the total 
inventory cost and risk at the lowest level which equals to the safe inventory level 
according to the law. So the optimal situation of inventory is that the transport of 
coal is seamlessly connected with the coal consumption of a thermal power station 
with a scientific inventory level in case the supply chain is broken for some 
unexpected reasons.   
 
If the efficiency of coal transportation can be improved dramatically, SEG is able to 
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reduce the capital cost tied up with the coal inventory, and the holding cost of the 
inventory will also be decreased by the optimization of coal inventory as well. 
Afterwards, I will elaborate three specific logistics solutions to improve the 
competitive advantage of SEG. Hereby, I must declare that the following calculation 
will all be based on the assumption that SEG is capable to run the logistics service as 
competitive as the professional logistics enterprises do, and the supply chain of SEG 
follows a JIT mode. 
 
2.1 The In-house Logistics Operational Solution 
 
As the scheme of this section goes, I am going to analyze the in-house strategy. If 
SEG wants to do logistics on its own, it needs to acquire the assets to fulfill the coal 
transportation, such as ships, warehouses, trucks and so on. These investments will 
cause interest lost tied up with the capital and those assets will depreciate year by 
year. Thereafter, I will apply financial formula and calculations to the analyses of 
in-house strategy. In order to make the problem easier, I will take the Mawan Power 
Station as an example, and other cases are similar to this example. 
 
The safe inventory level of coal equals to the amount that is enough to generate 
electricity for two consecutive weeks or 14 days according to empirical experience 
of a thermal power station and the regulations from the provincial administration. In 













 tons. The 
quay of Manwan Power Station has two berths, each of which has the capacity of a 
50,000 tons ship according to what He, W.Q. and Gao, Y.Z. has mentioned in the 
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article of “Terminal Structural Design for Shenzhen Mawan Power Plant”. However, 
in fact, even a ship with the deadweight of about 68,000 MT can still be discharged 
in this berth1. In terms of the stowage factor of coal, such a ship can carry about 
65,000 tons of coal in average2. According to the theory of economy of scale, the 
larger the ships are, the lower the average cost of coal per ton will be. However, the 
depth of the two berths in Mawan power station restrains large ships from berthing. 
So I take the ships with a DWT of 65,000 tons as the coal carriers for Mawan power 
station, and with these ships the cost of coal per ton can be optimized. In addition, 
Mawan power station can also employ smaller ships to fulfill the coal transport 
service, but the average cost of coal per ton will increase accordingly. SEG would 
not choose this strategy unless under some special or urgent circumstances. For 
instance, SEG could not prepare adequate coal to transport when the coal supply is 
interrupted temporarily by some unexpected reasons. 
 
According to empirical experience, it takes about 17 days to complete a round-trip 
voyage from Qinghuangdao to Mawan Power Station3. One full ship of coal can 
provide enough fuel for this power station to operate for about =
260,17
000,65 3.77 days. 
So Mawan Power Station requires =
77.3
17 5 ships as the minimum number of ships 
to transport coal. However, the above conclusion is based on the assumption of an 
existing two-week inventory of coal. So this model will not be valid under some 
emergent situations, such as coal shortage or fire accidents of coal. 
 
 
                                                        
1 The documents of COSCO Shenzhen Shipping Corporation have detailed information about the ships carrying 
coal for Mawan Power Station, like Peng Wei having the DWT of 68676 MT. 
2 This number is not calculated but from the documents of COSCO Shenzhen Shipping Corporation, so herein the 
stowage factor of coal is about 1.06 that is less than the ordinary factor of 1.30-1.42. 
3 The voyage time can be calculated according to the data from table 4. 
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Table 4 - Voyage Time from Mawan Power Station to Qinghuangdao (Days) 
Voyage Time 
from M to Q  
Load Time  
Voyage Time 





5.15 3.35 5.01 3.23 16.74 
Source: The documents of COSCO Shenzhen Shipping Corporation. (2006). Shenzhen: Author. 
 
If SEG decides to operate the logistics service on its own, this enterprise has to 
invest 5 ships at least. According to the regulations of the offshore transport, the 
maximum age of a bulk carrier in service cannot be over than 33 years old, and in 
order to take the uncertainties into account and make the calculation simpler, I take 
the maximum age of a ship in service as 30 years. Now, SEG still has three options: 
to purchase five new bulk carriers, to acquire five second-hand ones, or to 
time-charter five bulk carriers. Moreover, I have to point out that SEG could also 
apply a portfolio strategy for the in-house logistics service. For instance, SEG could 
purchase some new ships whist the rest ships could be second-hand or 
time-chartered. But the strategic decision of a portfolio situation has also to be 
determined by the different features of new ship mode, second-hand ship mode and 
time-charter ship mode respectively. Hereinafter, I will analyze these three situations 
respectively. 
 
New Ship Mode 
 
According to table 5, I can calculate the average building price of a new ship with a 
DWT of 70-75,000 is 30 million US dollars in the year of 2004. In order to avoid the 
complexity of the price fluctuation of shipbuilding, I take 30 million as the 
shipbuilding price of Shenzhen Energy Group despite the variation and risk involved 
in the ship building market. Because SEG is not a shipping enterprise in China, its 
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ships can only be applied to the straight-line depreciation according to the Chinese 
tax law. In light of the tax law, if SEG purchases ships on its own, it cannot enjoy the 
tax-reduction privileges as a shipping service enterprise. Therefore, the total capital 
cost of ships is 30×5=150 million US dollars in the present value. Moreover, it 
takes about 18 months to build such a ship, so SEG will spend at least 18 months to 
build these 5 ships simultaneously. And I take 2 years as the total new-ship building 
time in light of those uncertainties. However, when the new-ship building market is 
booming, all the shipyards around the world are fully occupied as what has been 
happening in recent years, and the time of building a new ship will be much longer 
than under this circumstance. But I ignore this aspect in order to avoid the 
complexity of those unexpected market conditions and make the results of these 
calculations more understandable. 
 
The average cost of a single voyage is about 260,000 US dollars, so the operation 
cost of a single ship is 000,600,5
17
365000,260 =×  US dollars annually. The interest 
rate is 3.60% of a 5-year-period deposit account in China, and I take this rate as the 
discount rate of the NPV calculation. As a result, the discounted value of the total 
operation cost of a single bulk carrier running for 30 years equals to PV (3.60%, 30, 
5.6) = 101.72 million. However, in terms of the time of building the ships, the 
present value of the total operation cost of a single bulk carrier equals to 
=
+ 2%)60.31(
72.101 94.8 million. The scrapping market varies greatly as well, and I take 
the recent market price as the final scrapping price in order to limit the complexity of 
the model. The latest price of scrapping market is about 300 US dollars per ton 
according to “the import of the hulk in the beginning of this year”, Recycle of 
Chinese Resources (2006), and the average light ship with a DWT of about 60,000 
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tons weighs around 10,000 tons. So the present value of the final scrapping income 




×  million. So the NPV of this 
investment equals to: 
 
)619(97.058.945150 =×+×−−=NPV  Million US dollars 
 
Table 5 - Bulk Carrier Building Price in 2004 (million USD) 



















14.5 16.5 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 18.5 19.0 
45-55,000 
dwt 
19.0 19.5 28.0 28.5 28.5 28.5 27.5 28.5 
70-75,000 
dwt 
21.0 23.0 31.5 32.5 32.5 32.5 31.5 33.0 
150-180,000 
dwt 
34.5 38.0 52.5 52.5 52.5 53.5 54.0 58.5 
Source: The Drewry Monthly. (2004). 10. 
 
Second-hand Ship Mode 
 
The second ship model is very complex, because the age of such a bulk carrier can 
vary in a wide range. And all these second-hand ships cannot endure in service for 
the same period of time due to the different quality of various ships made by 
different shipyards and the different abrasion levels of various ships maintained by 
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different seafarers. As a result, there might be numerous different cases, and I 
assume that SEG purchase a ship of 15 years in service, because there was a similar 
case that in the year of 2005, “Gleamray Maritime of Greece sold a ship of 69332 
dwt built in 1990 to Pt.Arpeni of Indonesia at the price of 29 million US dollars” 
according to Monthly Comment on the World Ship Market. Additionally, the 
second-ship market is changing dramatically from year to year, and I cannot find any 
strong connection between the age of a ship and its price, so I am not able to 
formulize the numerical relationship between the age and price. It also prevents me 
from optimizing the age of the acquired used ship. And the second-hand ships also 
enjoy an advantage of quick entrance into the market, because they do not need any 
construction period. As a result, they can be put into service immediately after the 
trades of second-hand ships are settled despite a very short period of time to import 
these ships into the domestic offshore transport market, because the China Maritime 
Code regulates that the Chinese domestic offshore transport can only be fulfilled by 
those ships flying the Chinese flags. 
. 
If SEG purchased the 15-year-old ships, the number of the ships should be 5×
15
30   
=10. And I take 30 years as the total service time of those ships in order to be in 
accordance with the case mentioned before. But the acquisition interval of every 5 
ships should be 15 years, because SEG only needs 5 ships in every 15 years. So the 








529529 230 Million US dollars 
 
The present value of the total operation cost of these 10 ships equals to: 
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PV= 5×PV (3.60%, 30, 5.6) = 508.6 Million US dollars 
 











×  Million US dollars 
 
And the total NPV of this investment should be: 
 
NPV=-230-508.6+14= (724.6) Million US dollars 
 
Time-Charter Ship Mode 
 
According to the current offshore market condition, the daily hire of a ship with 
70,000 DWT is about 20,000 USD. So the annual hire of these five ships equals to 
36.536,500,0005365000,20 ==××  million USD. And the present value of total 
hire of these five ships in thirty years equals to: 
 
3315)5.36,30%,60.3(5 =×= PVPV  Million 
 
In a time-charter party, the charterer should be responsible for the voyage cost1, so 
the discounted value of the total operation cost of a single bulk carrier running for 30 
years equals to PV (3.60%, 30, 5.6) = 101.72 million. The total discounted value of 
the operational cost of these five ships is 101.72×5=508.6 million. As a result, the 
NPV of this strategy should be: 
                                                        
1 Professor Sandevarn has mentioned this in his class. 
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)6.3823(6.5083315 =−−=NPV  Million US dollars 
 
In conclusion, the NPV of the New Ship Model has the highest value, and as a result, 
if SEG wants to operate the logistics service on its own, it had better to purchase five 
new ships to run the offshore seaborne transport. However, this strategy is 
time-consuming, and if time doe not permit, SEG should acquire five second-hand 
ships to save time though this strategy will cost a little bit more. And SEG should not 
consider to time-charter five ships to run coal transport unless under some emergent 
occasions, for instance, temporary coal-transport shortage. As I have mentioned in 
the foregoing chapter, a portfolio strategy can also be used when SEG is capable to 
operate logistics service as well as a professional shipping company. In other words, 
SEG could purchase both new and used ships whilst chartering ships to do this 
offshore coal transportation. But the proportion of new, second-hand and 
time-chartered ships in the portfolio should depend on the purpose of the project. For 
instance, if the project mainly focuses on the Net Present Value, new ships are 
mostly preferred. But if the project mainly concentrates on the time consumed, 
second-hand ships or time-chartered ships are mostly desirable. With the help of 
linear programming, an optimal portfolio strategy can be worked out. However, this 
in-house strategy suffers from a disadvantage of inflexibility or elasticity. For 
instance, when SEG cannot prepare enough coal to transport from North to South, it 




                                                        
1 The ships under a time charter party cannot be easily changed either. 
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2.2 The Outsourcing Logistics Operational Solution 
 
The sub-company of SEG now is outsourcing its coal transport to COSCO Shenzhen 
through a contract of affreightment, and the latest freight rate is about 7.5 US dollars 
per metric ton. And the annual total coal consumption of Mawan Power Station is 
6,300,000 tons. So the annual total freight cost of coal for this thermal power station 
equals to: 
 
3.47000,250,47000,300,65.7 ==×  Million US dollars 
 
And the discounted net present value of total freight in thirty years equals to: 
 
15.859)3.47,30%,60.3( == PVNPV  Million US dollars 
 
So the NPV of this strategy equals to (859.15) million USD. However, the 
calculation above ignores the fluctuation of the offshore market freight rate in thirty 
years. In other words, the assumption of the outsourcing mode underestimates the 
risk involved in the offshore seaborne trade market. The freight rate of coal in this 
case is above the average freight rate level because the current market is higher than 
the ordinary conditions.  
 
When the freight rate of coal varies 1 USD per metric ton, the NPV of this strategy 
will change: 
 
43.114)3.6,30%,60.3( == PVNPV  Million US dollars 
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The operational cost of coal transport per ton equals to: 
 
000,65
000,260 = 4 US dollars per ton 
 
Regardless of the depreciation of the bulk carriers, the lowest freight rate the 3PL 
can offer is 4 US dollars per ton. As a result, the highest NPV of this strategy equals 
to1: 
 
)7.457()3.64,30%,60.3( =×= PVNPV  Million US dollars 
 
So the Net Present Value of this strategy can vary from (457.7) million US dollars to 
(859.15) million US dollars. In order to make the calculation easier and more 
understandable, I take the mean of (457.7) and (859.15) as the final NPV of this 








=NPV  Million US dollars 
 
This strategy is much more flexible than the in-house strategy because SEG can ask 
for both larger and smaller size of ships due to the terms of the COA. If SEG can 
control the operational cost as well as a professional enterprise, the net present value 
of the new ship mode in the in-house strategy roughly equals to that of the 
outsourcing strategy. However, on one hand, SEG cannot do as well as a professional 
shipping service firm. On the other hand, the risk involved in the offshore shipping 
                                                        
1 According to the classic economics theory, one firm can also operate when the market price equals to the 
variable cost. 
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market cannot be simply explained or calculated as the average value of the highest 
and lowest freight rate level because I cannot guarantee that the freight rate of the 
offshore shipping market goes like a linear function. As a result, this calculated 
outcome is a rough reference or indication of the reality. 
 
2.3 The Joint-Venture Logistics Operational Solution 
 
Personally, I advocate this logistics mode very much, because it is a hybrid 
operational mode which combines the advantages of both in-house and outsourcing. 
Hereinafter, I will elaborate the financial outcomes of every specific situation in this 
mode, which might have very interesting or unique appearances. Though I strongly 
support this solution, some of the financial results cannot match my viewpoint or 
even reverse my suggestion. Why does this happen? The main reason lies in the 
assumptions I have made before. I have assumed that SEG can do logistics as well as 
professional logistics enterprises, and the freight rate of the joint venture is the same 
as the market rate. In the next chapter, I am going to explain the effects of these 
assumptions, and discuss how these options will change according to the changes of 
the assumptions. 
 
Usually, each of the electric enterprise and the logistics company will contribute half 
of the total assets of the joint venture, and I am not going to discuss the other 
situations of the stakeholders’ proportions. So the capital structure of the new 


















Figure 12 - Structure of the Joint Venture 
 
The shipping company must invest five ships as its assets in the joint venture, and 
SEG has to pay half of the total price of these five ships to COSCO as its assets1. 
This joint venture can also enjoy the privilege of flexibility. For instance, when the 
SEG cannot prepare adequate coal to transport, COSCO could find a smaller ship in 
its own fleet in a short period of time because the interest of COSCO is also 
connected with SEG through this joint venture. And I have calculated in the previous 
section that the strategy of building new ships costs least but is time-consuming, and 
second-ship mode costs more but saves time. Thereafter, I will analyze these two 
options for SEG respectively to do some comparison. 
 
New Ship Mode 
 
At the beginning of this joint venture, SEG has to pay half of the total price of these 
five ships, which equals to 75 million USD. Additionally, SEG has to pay 14 million 
USD as the cash flow of half a year for the joint venture, while the other half should 
be paid by COSCO2. However, it will take at least two years for the joint venture to 
                                                        
1 The two parties can also use other ways to cooperate with each other through negotiation, for instance, 40% and 
60% stock share cooperation. 
2 This amount of cash flow is assumed hereby. And the cash flow can be more or less than this amount. 
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build these five ships; so during the first two years, this joint venture cannot start to 





 million USD. Moreover, SEG also has to pay 47.3 million USD 
annually to the joint venture as the freight1, and the present value of the total freight 
for thirty years equals to =
+ 2%)60.31(
)3.47,30%,60.3(PV 800.5 million USD. Thereafter, I 
will calculate the annual net income of this joint venture which is closely connected 
with the dividends of SEG with the help of an income statement. 
 
Table 6 - Income Statement of Joint Venture (New Ship)  
(Million) 
Revenue                                                 Year XXXX 
Freight                                                     47.3 
Costs and Expenses  
Operating, selling, general and administrative expenses               (28) 
Depreciation2                                                (5) 
Earnings before Interest and Tax                                 14.3 
Less Tax3                                                   (4.7) 
Net Earnings                                                  9.6 
 
If this joint venture does not retain any earnings and allocates all the net profit as the 
dividends to SEG and COSCO, the present value of the income from this joint 





PVPV  million USD. And at 
                                                        
1 I take the current freight rate of coal as the long term freight rate of coal in this joint venture. 
2 I use linear depreciation method to calculate the annual depreciation cost of this joint venture. 
3 The income tax rate equals to 33% in China. 
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the end of thirty years, the net assets of this joint venture equals to: 
 
Cash Flow + Scrapping Income = =×+ 000,10300000,000,28  31,000,000 = 31 
Million US dollars 
 
The present value of the assets is =
+ 32%)60.31(
31 10 million US dollars. 
 




10  (802.3) Million US dollars 
 
From the financial aspect, this strategy cannot compare with the in-house New Ship 
Mode. However, it is a theoretical calculation and inevitably, this calculation has 
ignored quite a lot of significant factors, such as the logistics expertise and the 
professional threshold. Unless SEG maintains its operational cost as COSCO does, 
the final outcome will change profoundly if SEG is not as competitive as COSCO in 
the logistics cost management. And I will analyze the influence of the operational 
cost in the following chapter. 
 
Second-hand Ship Mode 
 
This mode is quite similar to the second-hand ship mode I have mentioned before in 
the section of in-house logistics service. However, the major difference lies in the 
annual dividends from the joint venture, and the initial capital investment.  









+××=PV  Million USD 
 
Table 7 - Income Statement of Joint Venture (Second-hand Ship)  
(Million) 
Revenue                                                 Year XXXX 
Freight                                                     47.3 
Costs and Expenses  
Operating, selling, general and administrative expenses               (28) 
Depreciation                                                 (9.7) 
Earnings before Interest and Tax                                 9.6 
Less Tax                                                    (3.2) 
Net Earnings                                                  6.4 
 
Similarly, the initial cash flow that SEG has to invest must be adequate for the joint 
venture to run for half a year. Thus, the present value of the initial cash flow equals 
to 14 million. Since the joint venture can run once it is started, the present value of 
the total freight that SEG pays to the joint venture annually equals to 
 million US dollars. The present value of the total 
income from the joint venture equals to 
15.859)3.47,30%,60.3( =PV
1.58)2.3,30%,60.3( =PV  million US 





million US dollars. So the net present value of this strategy equals to: 
 
)65.924(4.51.5815.85914115 =++−−−=NPV  
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Like the result from the above analysis, the NPV of this strategy is even less than 
that of the Second-hand Ship mode in the in-house logistics section. But the outcome 
is based on the assumption that SEG can do logistics as well as the professional 
logistics enterprises, such as COSCO. Therefore, it is a question of core competence, 
and on most occasions, an unprofessional enterprise cannot do the job out of its own 
field as well as in its own field. Hereinafter, I will discuss this issue in Chapter Three 
in details; try to discover some factors behind the phenomena, and to draw some 

























3 The Comparisons of the Results from Each Different Solutions 
 
In-house versus Outsourcing 
 
It is interesting to find that if an enterprise can operate logistics as well as the experts 
do, it should do the logistics by its own. Because from the financial calculation I 
have done before, it is not difficult to find that in-house logistics service costs the 
enterprise least in the long term. However, the main flaw of this assumption lies in 
that usually an electric enterprise cannot arrange transport as well as a professional 
shipping company. Thus, SEG might not be able to control its logistics cost as 
COSCO does. 
 
However, the gap of management capability between SEG and COSCO cannot 
easily be identified or evaluated by numerical methods. So the authentic operational 
cost cannot be assumed accurately, thus the results of the calculation being not valid. 
I can only conclude that the NPV of the total operational cost weighs over than 70% 
of the total NPV of each strategy, so if the operational cost rises up significantly, the 
final NPV will change dramatically. As a result, operational cost is the most 
important factor that determines the in-house or outsourcing strategy in terms of 
financial performance.  
 
And in order to analyze the significance of this factor, I will introduce the concept of 
“NPV elasticity” of the operational cost. Herein, the “NPV elasticity” of the 
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operational cost stands for the amount of the final NPV that will change according to 
one unit change of operational cost. For example, if the operational cost changes 1 






PVPV Million US dollars 
 
in the mode of in-house logistics by building new ships. Similarly, if the operational 
cost changes 1 million per ship every year, the NPV of the strategy will change: 
 
8.90)1,30%,60.3(5 =×= PVPV Million US dollars 
 
in the mode of in-house logistics by acquiring second-hand ships. So from these 
calculations, I find that the final option of the strategy is greatly affected by the 
efficiency of the cost control of the whole logistics system. And if the annual 
operational cost per ship has gone up by 2 or 3 million US dollars, the current option 
of in-house logistics service will be discarded, because the NPV will change about 
200 or 300 million US dollars which is a remarkable proportion of the total NPV.  
 
Millions of cases has proven that TPL can reduce the total logistics cost 
astonishingly, such as the case of Shanghai General Motor Company. And the most 
important strategic reason for shippers to be interested in outsourcing their logistics 
activities is still a need to reduce costs or amount of capital invested. And figure 13 
will demonstrate that cost reduction ranks the top position among those driving 























Figure 13 - Strategic Reasons for Outsourcing 
Source: Peter van Laarhoven, Magnus Berglund, & Melvyn Peters. (2000). Third-party logistics in 
Europe--five years later. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 30, 
425-442. 
 
From figure 13, it is obvious that cost reduction is the overwhelming reason for an 
enterprise to outsource its logistics service. And figure 14 tells us that 40% of the 
enterprises’ intention of cost reduction has been fulfilled by the TPL, while only 9% 
of the original purpose was unsatisfied in 1998. Hence, I can conclude that TPL is a 
feasible for SEG to reduce its logistics cost. It is also evident that SEG could not do 
as well as COSCO. In terms of this, SEG should outsource the logistics service or 
cooperate with other professional logistics service providers in order to make its 
balance sheet more decent. 
 
However, though outsourcing logistics service reduces the total logistics cost, TPL 
also involves much risk. For instance, SEG might be afraid to lose the control of the 
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logistics system which is one of the core functions in SEG as well. Additionally, 
SEG might not be able to control the risk involved in the fluctuation of the shipping 
market efficiently. However, a joint venture can solve the shortages of TPL, because 
SEG can also monitor the logistics service as one of the chief stakeholders in the 
joint shipping entity. Beside this advantage, I will analyze some other factors that 


















Figure 14 - Expected and Actual Benefits from TPL 
Source: Peter van Laarhoven, Magnus Berglund, & Melvyn Peters. (2000). Third-party logistics in 
Europe--five years later. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 30, 
425-442. 
 
Outsourcing versus Joint-Venture 
 
As what I have discussed before, SEG should outsource its logistics service through 
TPL or a joint venture method rather than the in-house logistics mode. However, at 
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the first glance, it seems to be more desirable for SEG to outsource the logistics 
service than to cooperate with COSCO through a joint venture. But are there some 
key factors that have profound effects on the option of this strategy as what I have 
just discussed in the former section of in-house versus outsourcing? The answer is 
YES. 
 
The key factor of the joint venture is the annual freight paid by SEG, because it is not 
difficult to find that the freight contributes over than 96% of the total NPV in each 
strategy. With the same methodology, I will calculate the effect of one unit change in 
the freight, and it can be taken as the “NPV elasticity” of the freight. 
 
If the freight changes one million US dollars each year, the total NPV of this option 







PVPV  Million US dollars 
 
If the freight changes one million US dollars each year, the total NPV of this option 
of acquiring second-hand ships in joint venture mode will change: 
 
18)1,30%,60.3( =PV  Million US dollars 
 





==eFreightRat  US dollars per ton 
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Obviously, the freight rate of coal can be negotiated easily if SEG cooperates with 
COSCO when they have established a joint venture with each other. I take the 
optimal situation as the bottom line when the gross profit equals to zero. So the 
current annual freight can be reduced by 14.3 million US dollars or 9.6 million US 
dollars at most. And the maximum NPV that can be reduced by the freight reduction 
equals to 243 million USD and 173 USD respectively. Obviously, these are very 
outstanding numbers which could have fundamental effects on the final decision.  
 
If the freight changes one million US dollars each year, the total NPV of the income 










PVPV Million US dollars 
 
If the freight changes one million US dollars each year, the total NPV of the income 





=××= PVPV  Million US dollars 
 
Hereby, I will calculate the balance point when the NPV of the new ship mode of a 
joint venture equals to that of the outsourcing mode. 
 
When these two NPVs are the equal, the annual total freight should be: 
 





−  Million US dollars 
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Hence, the current freight rate ought to be reduced by 2
3.6
7.12
=  USD per metric 
tone. As a result, when the freight rate is over than 5.5 USD per ton, the option of 
outsourcing is better than that of the acquisition of new ships of a joint venture; and 
when the freight rate is less than 5.5 USD per ton, the option of the acquisition of 
new ships of a joint venture is better than that of outsourcing. 
 
Hereafter, I will analyze the balance point when the NPV of the second-hand ship 
mode of a joint venture equals to that of the outsourcing mode. 
 
When these two NPVs are the same, the annual total freight should be: 
 





−  Million US dollars. 
 
Hence, the current freight rate ought to be reduced by 5.3
3.6
3.22
=  USD per metric 
tone. As a result, when the freight rate is over than 4 USD per ton, the option of 
outsourcing is better than that of the acquisition of second-hand ships of a joint 
venture; and when the freight rate is less than 4 USD per ton, the option of the 
acquisition of second-hand ships of a joint venture is better than that of outsourcing. 
 
The above result is very important, because on most occasions, when a joint venture 
is initiated, the professional logistics enterprise is willing to provide the transport 
facilities from its current fleet because in the way, it can withdraw the capital 
investment tied up with the ships as soon as possible. Therefore, SEG should exert 
itself to negotiate with COSCO to reduce the freight rate due to the cooperation 
between these two powerful giants in their own field. However, in fact, it is SEG 
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who wants to cut its logistics cost strongly. In terms of the financial aspect, COSCO 
will lose half of the profit compared with the strategy of cutting the freight rate. But 
in other hand, COSCO could obtain half of the total price of 5 ships in advance. And 
from this aspect, the investment of those ships can be withdrawn earlier than the plan 
operated by COSCO on its own. Additionally, COSCO can also avoid the risk 
involved in the fluctuation of the shipping market, because no matter how 
dramatically the shipping market changes, this joint venture remains to be a cash 
cow of COSCO, and the ships involved in this strategic alliance will never be out of 
job or hunt for food on their own. Hence, the two parties in this strategic alliance 
will mutually benefit from this negotiation, and the two members should trade off 
the benefits and losses during the negotiation. 
 
New Ships versus Second-hand Ships 
 
It is known that the demand for ocean transport has increased strongly in the past a 
few years, because the Chinese economy, especially its steel industry, has grown 
rapidly recently. And the prosperity of the steel industry definitely causes the 
booming of iron ore import. Hence, the ocean freight rate will go up responsively. 
The market is so sensitive and elastic that the investment of ships has become much 
more than before. Because the bankers are very conservative and averse to risk, they 
are not willing to provide any loan to those ship owners when the shipping market 
performs poorly. When the freight rate goes up, it is easy for those ship owners to 
finance enough money from the banks to build new ships. Afterwards, the price of 
both new and second-hand ships will rise up. 
 
Nowadays, the acquisition of new ships is more competitive than the acquisition of 
second-hand ships, which is mainly caused by the sublime market price of 
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second-hand ships. Because the freight rate has rocketed-up dramatically in recent 
years, the price of a second-hand ship is almost as much as that of building a new 
one. In fact, this phenomenon is very abnormal and unusual.  
 
Thus, under what conditions should SEG build new ships, and when should SEG 
purchase second-hand ships? I will demonstrate the calculation procedure to 
conclude the results. 
 
It is important to find this very point when the NPV of both new ships and 
second-hands ships are the same, because SEG could choose any one of the two 
strategies at this point. 
 
Assume: New Ship Price = A  












In conclusion, when the price of a new ship is about 1.6 times as the price of a 
second-hand ship, the two options are both feasible. Furthermore, when the price of 
a new ship is less than 1.6 times of the price of a second-hand ship, SEG should 
choose to build new ships. Similarly, when the price of a new ship is more than 1.6 
times of the price of a second-hand ship, SEG should choose to purchase 
second-hand ships. Obviously, when the transport market is as high as the situation 
now, the price of a second-hand ship is as much as a new one. It is wise for SEG to 
build new ships. However, when the transport market falls dramatically, the price of 
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a second-hand ship will be as low as the scrapping value. It is wise for SEG to 
purchase second-hand ships instead. However, when the ship-building market is 
booming dramatically, the new ship-building will take quite a longer time than the 
ordinary average time, so the discount period will change accordingly and the 
introduction of new ships will be even harder. Hence, the NPV of new ship-building 
mode will be different. Hereby, the fluctuation of the ship building market has been 
ignored, and as a result, the conclusion cannot be valid sometimes during the 

























4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
From the above analyses, I suggest that it is best for SEG to cooperate with a 
professional logistics provider, such as COSCO, in order to reduce the total logistics 
cost by means of a joint venture. Moreover, this joint venture should firstly choose to 
build new ships under the current market condition, and in favor of SEG, the freight 
rate that SEG pays to this joint venture could be further lower than the market level. 
However, if the logistics partner is not willing to purchase new ships or the current 
transport capacity for SEG is so limited that this joint venture has to buy 
second-hand ships; on one hand, SEG has to persuade the logistics partner to make 
use of a portfolio strategy that means to acquire both new and second-hand ships. On 
the other hand, SEG can ask this joint venture for a lower freight rate as well. 
 
However, for that logistics provider, the situation will be adjusted a little bit. It is 
desirable for this joint venture to build new ships under the current market condition 
too. But this logistics expert should try to increase the freight rate in order to gain 
more profit every year. So from this aspect, the two parties involved in this strategy 
should trade off the freight rate issue according to the market conditions. The risk 
and profit of such a joint venture ought to be balanced for both the two parties, and 
only when the freight rate is at an optimal level, can the two parties involved in such 
a joint venture gain the best profit and reduce the risk to the lowest level. 
 
This type of logistics operational mode combines the advantages of both the third 
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party logistics and the in-house logistics service. For instance, through this logistics 
mode, Shenzhen Energy Group can better integrate the whole supply chain of all the 
thermal power stations under the name of this energy group, such as Mawan Power 
Plant, the Moon Bay Power plant etc. SEG can procure all the coal consumed by the 
thermal power stations together as an integrated entity, and this kind of procurement 
method could make the procurement cost much lower than the thermal power 
stations purchase fuel coal separately, because SEG will have stronger bargaining 
power as a larger buyer than as isolate entities. Similarly, in the transport filed, the 
integrated buyer can also have stronger bargaining power. Additionally, Shenzhen 
Energy Group could even invest in the coalmines to integrate the upstream of the 
supply chain completely or partially. For example, SEG can cooperate with some 
large coalmines all around China, just like the cooperation with COSCO in the 
transportation field. Or instead, SEG can even establish coalmine firms to mine coal 
for its own power stations. However, this strategic decision also varies from case to 
case depending on different situations, like the transport integration of the supply 
chain.  
 
Additionally, through this joint venture mode, SEG can reduce the whole supply 
chain cost due to the increased transport efficiency, like third party logistics. 
However, SEG can control the coal transport better than the third party logistics 
mode instead. And SEG can also have the privilege to transport its coal at a lower 
price regardless of the transport market conditions. However, unlike the in-house 
logistics mode, SEG does not have to tie up huge capital with building new ships or 
purchasing second-hand ships. Instead, another professional carrier, such as COSCO, 
can share the risk and investment involved in such a project. In addition, the joint 
venture has more logistics expertise than the transport firm set up by SEG alone. 
And this joint venture is much stronger than the current one because this new firm is 
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supported by two powerful groups. Furthermore, this joint venture can enjoy the 
tax-reduction privileges like a professional shipping service enterprise. The 
tax-reduction privileges can make the balance sheet of the joint venture much better 
than SEG does logistics on its own. Furthermore, the ships in the fleet of this joint 
venture can be more flexible because the professional shipping service provider 
could offer or alter the trading ships in case the market changes. 
 
However, this joint venture requires higher level of management skills than a 
transport firm established by only one enterprise alone, because this joint venture has 
to be monitored and managed by these two enterprises, such as the financial 
statements and management staff. Moreover, the higher level of management 
expertise needs more investment and cost. As a result, one of the main disadvantages 
of this joint venture mode is that the two parties involved in this new firm have both 
to be powerful and strong enterprises that possess professional management 
expertise and strong financial capacity. Therefore, this joint venture mode can only 
be used by large enterprises. In this case, SEG happens to be a state-owned large 
enterprise. Hence, SEG just has to look for a large and strong enterprise to establish 
such a joint venture, such as COSCO or China Shipping. 
 
In conclusion, the two parties have to trade off the number of new and second-hand 
ships, and try to build as many new ships as possible under the current market 
conditions. Furthermore, in order to achieve a situation of mutual benefit for both the 
two parties involved in this strategic alliance, the joint venture should find a 
scientific freight rate that will change annually according to the shipping market and 
the negotiation between the two parties. And in the long term, Shenzhen Energy 
Group should also invest in some coalmines in order to reduce the raw material 
procurement cost. This joint venture mode can reduce all the risk involved in the 
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shipping market fluctuation to the optimal level, and combine the strength of both 
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